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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
An action to set aside a termination of joint tenancy.

DISPOSITION

LOWER COURT

L~

When respondent filed for divorce, his wife, Betty Nelson,
who '"as appellant's mother, terminated t21e joint tenancy on the
home owned by ner and respondent.

On the death of Betty Nelson,

before a decree of divorce had been entered, Mr. Nelson brought
this

ac~ion

against appellant who is executrix of her mother's

estate, to have the termination of joint tenancy set aside, and
Judge Sawaya granted respondent such relief.

RELIEF SOUGHT O:-< ."'.PPEAL
Reversal of Judge Sawaya's order, reinstating as valid and
effective Mrs. Nelson's termination of the joint tenancy.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
T21e parties married on March ll, 1976.

Each had children

by prior marriages, each having been Wldowed.
Mrs. Nelson had a chlld, Michelle Davis, born March 7, 1955,
as lssue of her marriage to her deceased husband.

Subsequently,

she remarried, havlng a chlld by her second marriage, Monique
Skinner, born Februar:/ 26, 1962.

That marriage ended in divorce.

Mrs. Nelson and her children were Australlan.
immigr3ted to the L'nlted States ln late 1975.

Mrs. Nelson

On arrival in Utah,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-]-

she bought a horne occupied by herself and her daughters.

She sold

this horne on her marriage to Mr. Nelson, and he made her a joint
tenant on his horne in Salt Lake City, Utah.
She was 50 years of age at the time of her marriage to Mr.
Nelson.
Mr. Nelson's first wife died of a stroke in 1975.
Betty Nelson died of cancer on May 24, 1977.

~----·

References in this brief to the parties refer to appellant
as Mrs. Nelson and and respondent as Mr. Nelson, as appellant's
interest in the case is solely as executor of her mother's estate,
and the matters in issue were between Douglas and Betty Nelson.
The parties resided together continuously from the date of
their marriage until the end of September,

1~6.
~.0

__._

Mrs. Nelson had been in robust health, had taken a vacation
with Mr. Nelson to California in June, but then rapidly became ver;
ill.

On being hospitalized in September, 1976, surgery was perforJ!

and a number of inoperable cancers were discovered in her abdomina:
area.
The entire domestic file was received in evidence as an exh1·
bit.

(T 106, L 5-8)

The domestic file, case D-24033, Salt Lake

County District Court, is included under separate cover in the
record on appeal designated as Supplemental Index (SI)
cal report on her condition is included.
Mr. Nelson moved out of the home.

The medl-

(SI 189-190)
By complaint dated Septem·

ber
28,by the
1976,
and
filed
October
1976,
he ofsought
annulment
based
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on fraud, or alternatively, divorce.

During the number of hearings

that followed in the domestic case, he did not pursue the matter of
annulment nor profer proof on fraud.
Mrs. Nelson's cancer progressed so rapidly that, by the time
the case was ready for trial, she was bedridden and so ill that the
case couldn't be tried.
Her older daughter, Michelle, had a job in Salt Lake City,
and resided out of the parties' horne, but on Mr. Nelson moving out,
Michelle moved into the horne and remained there until her mother's
death, caring for her mother.

The then 14 year old child, Monique,

resided with her mother and Mr. Nelson through their marriage.
Because the case was never tried, there is no adjudication
as to the merits of the parties' domestic claims and financial positions.

For that reason, this brief will incorporate the appropriate

allegations from the complaint of Mr. Nelson and the counterclaim
of Mrs. Nelson to set forth their positions.

COMPLAINT
"4. That the defendant, in order to induce the plaintiff
to ~arry her represented to him that she would maintain
a normal relationship as a wife with the plaintiff, would
treat him with love and affectlon, and would give him the
respect that a husband would expect of a wife all of which
was done for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to marry
the defendant.
Sald representations were false when made
and were known bv the defendant to be false when made,
and were made to. the plaintiff for the purpose of inducing
the plaintiff into marrying the defendant.
Based upon said
misrepresentations the plaintiff entered into the marital
relatlonship with the defendant, and based further upon
said representations said marriage should be annuled, and
each byparty
placed
back
lnto
the
position
they
prior
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"6. That prior to the marriage of the parties the plaintiff was the owner of a home located at 3061 Canyon View
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, and had for many years prior
thereto lived in said residence with his first wife, who,
prior to the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant
passed away after having suffered a stroke."
(SI 166)
"8. That the defendant has funds of her own and is capable of supporting herself, and due to the short duration
of the marriage between the parties, the plaintiff should
not be required to pay the defendant anything by way of
support with the exception of the sum of $100.00 per month
for a period of three months commencing October 1, 1976,
and ceasing with the last month of payment being required
in December, 1976." (SI 166)
"10. That the plaintiff has purchased some items of household effect at the insistance of the defendant during the
marriage, and said effects have been purchased with the
funds of the plaintiff, and should be awarded to the plaintiff along with all of the property he owned prior to the
marriage including, real, personal,or mixed property of
whatever kind and nature and wherever located."
(SI 167)
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant
either annuling the marriage and declaring same void, or
in the alternative that the Court does not find sufficient
grounds for an annulment that the plaintiff be awarded
a Decree of Divorce from the defendant divorcing the plaintiff from the defendant and disolving the bonds of matrimony, and awarding to the plaintiff his horne located at
3061 Canyon View Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, and any and
all personal property, real property, or mixed property
of whatever kind or wheresoever located that the plaintiff
owned prior to his marriage of short duration to the defendant, or purchased by the plaintiff during his short mar~i
age with the defendant, with the defendant to oe awarded
the property that she owned prior to the marriage and
brought into the marriage with her, with each party to
assume, pay, and hold the other party harmless from any
and all obligations on the property awarded to the respective parties, and for an Order of the Court requlring the
defendant to vacate the horne of the plaintlff located at
3061 Canyon View Circle, Salt Lake City, utah not later
than the first day of December, 1976, and that each partY
be awarded their automobile that they owned p~ior to their
marriage and brought into the marriage with them, and for
such other and further relief as to the court seems just
and equitable in the premises.
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney 28th
Law Library.
Funding
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ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
"2. Plaintiff has treated defendant cruelly causing her
great mental and physical suffering and distress by refusing to live with her, provide for her or care for her since
discovery of, and treatment for an inoperable condition of
cancer of her internal organs, and has treated her cruelly
in other ways.
"3. In latesurnrner, defendant was hospitalized at the LDS
Hospital, her cancer was then diagnosed for the first time
and she was operated on, the operation being a colostomy.
She is now receiving regular chemotherapy and is not physically capable of working for wages.
"4. Defendant resides with her two daughters, Michelle, age
21, and Monique, age 14.
She and her daughters carne to
the United States 14 months ago from Australia, their
native land.
In connection with marrying plaintiff, defendant gave up a widow's pension of $247.00 from the
Australian government. She has made inquiry to see if
it can be reinstated, and has not yet received a reply.
"5. Defendant was purchasing home which she sold at a loss
to her of approximately $3,000.00 and moved into plaintiff's
home at the time of their marriage, all on plaintiff's insistence.
She had $1,400.00 in savings all of which have
been spent by her on joint bills of the marriage and a
California vacation for plaintiff and defendant in June,
1976. She also sold her stove and bedroom furniture at
plaintiff's insistence, giving him the proceeds. Defendant
is presently without funds, or a place to live other than
the home occupied by plaintiff at the time of their marriage,
which he has conveyed into their joint names.
"6. Defendant had health insurance on herself and her
daughters which she gave up at plaintiff's insistence on
their marriage, thereafter and presently being covered by
plaintiff's insurance he being an employee of an insurance
company.
"WHEREFORE defendant prays judgment as follows:
"1. For a Decree of separate maintenance, or as a secondary
alternative, for a Decree of Divorce at such time as is
appropriate.
"2. For an immediate Order of court allocating obligations
of the ~arties, allowing defendant temporary and permanent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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support and alimony, allowing defendant use of the home
at 3061 Canyon View Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, with
the plaintiff being restrained from entering onto.such
premises or its real property without express ~nv~tat~on,
for her temporary and final costs and fees here~n, re- .
quiring plaintiff to maintain fully all insurance.on wh~ch
defendant is beneficiary, or life insurance on wh~ch he 1s
principal.
"3. For such other relief as the court may deem proper.
"DATED October 15, 1976."

(SI 169-170)

Because Mrs. Nelson is deceased, it should be noted that
verified the content of her Answer and Counterclaim.

s~e

(SI 170-1711

Before marrying Mr. Nelson, Betty Nelson had employment anc
health insurance.

Mr. Nelson is an insurance executive and addec

her to his existing health insurance when they married.

As a res ..

of her marriage, Mrs. Nelson had neither employment nor health
insurance other than that provided through Mr. Nelson •.vhen he fl:;:
for divorce.
The treatment of cancer can reasonably be expected to be
pensive.

~x-

As Mr. Nelson's complaint did not offer to conti~ue he2:

insurance for Mrs. Nelson to meet her future cancer related meci::;
expense, offered only $100 a month for three months, sought

to~~

her out of the home and terminate her interest in the home, and
the income from the Australian government to

~rs.

Nelson as

of the 14 year old daughter, Monique, had terminated, Mrs.

mo~ 2 :
Nelsc~

was in a position of financial distress.
Mrs. Nelson filed a Motion for an Order Pendente

L~te wh:c~

came on for hearing on October 2 2, 19 76, be fore c!udge Dean E. Co~.:
At
that
Mrs. Funding
Nelson's
f1nanc1al
?roble:ns
:;-~':: Gefor 2
Sponsored
by thehearing,
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
for digitization
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Judge Conder.

Mr. Nelson, on his part, through his attorney Wendell

Bennett, presented a strong argument that i t was hard on him to
lose half equity in his home because his wife became terminally
ill after a short marriage.
Having

~onsidered

the matter, Judge Conder entered his Order

Pendente Lite allowing Mrs. Nelson to stay in the home, requiring
Mr. Nelson to make payments on the home,

and utilities, pay Mrs.

Nelson a living allowance of $150 per month,
sured.

and to keep her in-

(SI 179; Minute Order at SI 175)
This order was not signed by Judge Conder until November 4,

1976.

Reason for

November l,

1976,

th~s

delay is explained in the letter dated

from Mrs. Nelson's attorney, Samuel King,

Mr. :Jelson's attorney, \vendell Bennett.
letter a part of the court file.

to

Judge Conder made this

The letter stated:

"::lear Wendell:
"In view of the fact that you haven't responded to my
letters inviting negotiation nor approved nor commented
on the proposed Order for signature by Judge Conder, I
have no choice in order to orotect the financial security
of Mrs. ::Jelson and her estate, tJ:!qn__ tQ.__terminate the joint
tenancy and have her deed her interes_t in the prope_rty to
her adult child, Michelle.
This is now being done ai1d will
be recorded during the week.
"Sincerely,"

(SI 226)

On ::Jovember 3, 19 76, '1rs. :Jelson sJ.gned the termination.
·.vas recorded :Jovember 4, 19 76.

The termination provided:

"NOTICE OF TERMI:JATION OF JOINT TE::JA.t'JCY
"BETTY 'l. :/ELSON, nereby gJ.ves notice that she terminates
the joint~nancy between herself and Douglas A. Nelson,
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding forre:lected
digitization provided and
by the Institute
of Museum and Library
such by JOlnt
~nanc'j
oeJ.ng
established
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Quit
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It

Claim Deed dated May 13, 1976, and recorded May 14,
1976, in the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder,
entry #2814353, and relating to the real property
in Salt Lake County, Utah, described as:
'Lot 7, Canyon View Circle, according to the official
plat thereof.'
"DATED November 3rd, 1976.
/s/ Betty N. Nelson"
On receiving Mr. King's November 1, 1976, letter, !1r. Benne:
contacted Mr. King and asked him to review the matter

wiG~

Judge

Conder when the written order covering the October 22, 1976, hear·
ing was submitted.

Mr. King did this with Mr.

Bennett being con-

tacted and advised from chambers.
Judge Conder,being fully aware of the parties' positions,
signed the order and added beneath his signature:
"Defendant may convert the joint tenancy to tenancy in
common. Property cannot be conveyed to any third party.
D.C."
(SI 179)
To clarify exactly the effect of this Order, counsel

a9pea~

without pleadings in Judge Conder's chambers on November 5, 1976.
At that time, Judge Conder affirmed his order that "Defendant :na:·
convert the joint tenancy to tenancy in common," and stated:
"This order is entered to clarify the record.
The basis
on which the court entered its order of November 5, 1376
[sic,
the actual date was November .J, 1976], was as
follows:
"The parties are restrained from dispos1:1g of assets wn1~e
the case is pending. Defendant, however, has the r1ght to
ter~inate the joint tenancy and create a tenancy 1
commo~.
but is restrained from conveylng ner 1nterest 1n t e sa1d
property until further Order of the Court."
lSI 1 2, 183,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Mrs. Nelson's document terminating the joint tenancy was
recorded November 4,
Conder's chambers.

1976, by her counsel after leaving Judge
The Quit Claim Deed that she executed at the

same time as the termination was held by counsel pursuant to the
It was recorded June 3, 1977, after

instruction of Judge Conder.
~s.

Nelson's death.
On January 27, 1977,

to Record Deed.

Nelson filed a Motion for Leave

The medical report ind1cated that she might die

(SI 189,190)

any day.

~s.

The purpose of the motion was to allow

con•Jeyance of the property to t.'"le daughter,

~ichelle,

avo1d the cost and time that m1ght be involved
~lchelle

1~

so as to

praba~~.

with

JOini:1g ln t.'1e mot1on stating that she •,.;ould no"': convey

:.he property unt.:..l a.fter her mot.'1er' s death,

:..:1 the e•Jent that Mrs.

:1elson should have a rem1ss1on and be a.ble ::o appear for hearing
(SI 186-138)

of the d1 'JOrce.

Judge Davld K. Winder heard the mot1on and entered a Memorandum :)ecision

(SI 2')7,208)

ar.d Order

(SI 209).

In his decision

and order, Judge '•'ilnder den1ed lea•;e to record the dee9, re_cog~:..zed

the legally bi:1d1ng effect of the

~enancy

Termi~ation

of Joint

statl~g:

. The court fee!s no further transfer of the property
:r~n

~~e

0la.~~t~::

cr

je£enda~t

s~oG:d

be

~ade.

In

deny1ng t;e defendant's ~ot:..on, the court is certainly not
unm1ndf~l of the defendant's legltlmate 1nterest 1n a.ttemptl:1g tc 3'/0.J..d p:-cba:.-2 a:-:d ct.~er- probler.ls by tJrese:1t trans-

fer

~o

~er

adul~

da.~;~~e~

=~

~hateve~

~nterest

she

~as

in

the 306! Canyon ~1ew C1rcle property, and prior to her
jea:.:-:., ·.·l.--:.:.-.::: a ;>23:-.s .:.:-7\...~.:..:-:er.:., bu~ ":.:-:e -:curt feels that
unt.:..l all ~att ~s are resc:ved, .:.t ~culd te premature to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
~r3.:;s:e:- 3.:-:·.· ,:,
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On Mrs. Nelson' death, Mr. Nelson filed the present action.
The trial was extremely brief, the entire testimony covering or.l,·
22 pages (Transcript of Trial and Motion for New Trial, P ll-33).
The trial was so brief because the court entirely incorporated

~~

domestic file which covered all of the issues except the care o:
the home and yard given by Michelle while her mother was dying.
Mr. Nelson sought damages as to that, which Judge Sawaya denied.
Judge Sawaya also found:
"3. That following the creation of the joint tenancy by
the plaintiff Douglas A. Nelson with Betty N. Nelson, a
divorce action was filed, and the said Betty N. Nelson,
thereafter filed what was purported to be a notice of
termination of joint tenancy, and also executed a Quit
Claim Deed attempting to convey said property to ~ichel1e
Marion Davis, however, at the time said Quit Claim Deed
was executed the said Betty N. Nelson was under a Court
Order not to convey said property."
(T 76)
This finding was patently erroneous.

Judge Conder entered

no order restraining the parties in regard to property in the
October 22, 1976, hearing.
November 3, 1976.

The termination document was executed

On November 4, 1976, Judge Conder's hand-

written addition to his written order specifically recognized
that Mrs. Nelson had a right to make the termination.

This was

reaffirmed in his later order on the November 5, 1976, hearing
(SI 182,183), and by Judge Winder in his order (SI 207-2091.
There never was an order restrainlng

~rs.

Nelson frcm cer-

minating the joint tenancy.
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STATEMENT OF THE LAW
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
BETTY ~ELSON HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE
THE JOI~T TENfu~CY WITH OR WITHOUT LEAVE
OF COURT UNLESS RESTRAINED BY COURT ORDER,
AND THE ORDERS ALLOWING HER TO TERMINATE
ARE SI~PLY JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS THAT
SHE HAD CAUSE TO TER~INATE.
Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utah, filed

~arch

22, 1977, case num-

ber 14456, is ln point.
There, the husband conveyed real property which was ln his
name alone, during the time interval between divorce trial, which
awarded the wife a half interest in all of hls real property and
the time the decree embodying the verbal order was signed.

There

was no existing order of court restraining the parties from disposlng of their assets but the award of hal£ the property to the
w1fe was evidence of a judical intent to that effect.
In finding that the parties were free to dispose of assets
unless speciflcally restrained by court order while a domestic
action was pending, the court rev1ewed 30-3-5, UCA 1953, and held
that:
''It nelther authorizes nor proh1bits a party to a divorce
action from transferring assets during the pendency of the
proceedings.
The statute spec1fically sets forth the stage
of the proceeding aL which the court may exercise this
discretion--and that is 'when a decree of divorce is made
Appellunt concedes that a
Would be

~al~d.

r~stra1n1ng

order prior to trial

The po1nt of Hamilton is that the parties are

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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free to act until restrained by court order.

This holding is

conclusive on Mrs. Nelson's right to terminate the joint tenancy.
She was never restrained from so doing at any time.
The question is whether she had cause to do so.
Conder found that she did (SI 179, 182-183).

Judge

In reviewing that

order, Judge Winder affirmed her right to terminate, and accepted
as a fait accompli that she had done so.

(SI 209)

The domestic trial judges, Conder and Winder, had before
them the circumstances between the parties.

The entire case was

not adjudicated due to her death, but her having good cause to
terminate was ruled on.
A joint tenancy, where the parties have a right of survivor·
ship, is a close legal relationship with fiduciary characteristics

A party is entitled to terminate a joint tenancy either by consen:
of the other party, or by acts of the other party which are inimical to the close relationship.

14 AmJr 2d, Cotenancy and Joint

Ownership, §15, P 108.
Judge Conder's finding that Mrs. Nelson had the ''right" to
terminate the joint tenancy is certainly supported by the circumstances of Mr. Nelson filing for divorce on finding that she had
inoperable cancer, such filing including his attempt to evict her
from her home, no provision for her support, and termination of
her medical benefits.
Sympathy must be felt for a man who has his second wife
terminal the year after his first wife's death.

However,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~r.

Nelson acted so entirely in his own interest, that he forced Mrs.
Nelson to act to protect her children.

If, instead, he had stood

by her, she would never have had grounds to terminate the joint
tenancy and the home would now be his.
Mr. Nelson's acts of suing for annulment or divorce and
offering the terms he offered, did not constitute the degree of
concern for the other party's interest which characterizes a joint
tenancy relationship.

POINT II.
THE ORDER OF NOVEMBER 4, 1976, AUTHORIZING
MRS. NELSON TO TERMINATE THE JOINT TENN<CY
WAS A FINAL ORDER, NOT APPEALED, &~D IS NOW
RES JUDICATA.
Usually orders made during the pendency of litigation are
not final orders.

However, when those orders have a final effect

irrespectlve of the ultimate outcome of the case, then they are
final and appealable at that time.
Wheelwright v. Roman, 50 U 10, 165 P 513
Snow v. Snow, 13 U 15, 43 P 620
lhnnovlch ·v. Emery, 33 U 345, 93 P 988
State v. Booth, 21 u 88, 59 P 533
Rule 72(a),(b), URCP
Dal·; v. Dalv,

533 P2d 884

(Utah, 1975), is a case which set

aside a Decree of Divorce, when one party died after the decree
was entered but before it was flnal.

Daly restored the property

awarded to the decedent by the decree back to the survivor.
case lS clearly distingulshable.

That

It dealt with a JUdicial convey-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ance of property which became a nullity on the death of a necessary!
I

party to the action before the order was final.
In the case at bar, the order allowing termination of joint
tenancy was final.

Also, it did not convey property, but allowed

a change of relationship, for the express purpose of terminating
rights of survivorship.

It dealt with the legal rights of the

parties, but not with conveyance.
A domestic order pendente lite which immediately and perrnan·
ently effects property rights of the parties cannot be cured by
appeal after a decree has been entered.

For example, an order

allowing a party to dispose of, or convert assets, is final

in

the sense that the acts will be done, positions changed, and the
parties cannot be restored to their original position, by appeal
of the decree after it is entered.
The party could preserve the issue by taking an interlocuton
appeal.

Whether the interlocutory appeal is heard while the case

is pending, or, as is often the case, the Utah supreme Court reserves judgment until a final decree is entered, at least the
issue is preserved and the other party given notice.
Mrs. Nelson had full right to rely on the final effect of
Judge Conder's orders, as Mr. Nelson never preserved his right of
appeal.

Until her death, Mrs. Nelson acted on the basis that the

joint tenancy was terminated, which protected her children.
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POINT III.
JUDGE SAWAYA DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO
SET ASIDE ORDERS OF JUDGES OF THE SAME
LEVEL.
Judge Sawaya frankly and candidly admitted during the hearing
of appellant's motion (T 73-74) in which he made his order invalidating the termination of joint tenancy, that he made his order
based not so much on law as on equities.
At that hearing, he was asked by counsel if " ... you explained
your decision in this case by saying it was just so grossly unfair to Mr. Nelson to take away his half equity in the home that
he had put a lifetime into--," and Judge Sawaya agreed that was
the reason for his ruling.

(Trial transcript P 54 L 18 55 L 10)

Judge Sawaya had ruled, while the evidence was being presented, that he would not allow evidence from appellant as to the
equities, the questions before him being purely legal.

(Trial

transcript, P 54, L 18-23)
No complaint is made of Judge Sawaya.
followed equities rather than law.

On reflection, he

However, his change of ration-

ale did prejudice appellant because her equities had not gone into
evidence.

Thus, Judge Sawaya did not have the facts before him,

when he ruled, that Judge Conder had.

He allowed an offer of

proof at the hearing to have him modify his order, but by that
time he had his mind made up.
It is always greatly appreciated by counsel when a trial
judge candldly admits hls basls for a ruling that he makes, even
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of its assistance to counsel and the appellate court in finding
the basis of the ruling so as to better analyze it.
It was probably due to this equitable, rather than legal,
basis, of Judge Sawaya's ruling, that to support it, he made the
finding that Mrs. Nelson was under restraining order with prohibited her from termination of joint tenancy.

(T 76,

,13)

Such finding was appropriate and supported by the record
only in regard to a conveyance from Mrs. Nelson to her daughters,
but such finding being entirely unsupported, and contrary to the
orders of Judge Conder, in regard to termination of the joint
tenancy.
In effect, what Judge Sawaya did was to overrule the orders
of Judge Conder

allowing termination of the joint tenancy.

(SI 179, 182-183)
Judges do not have power to overrule judges of the same

co~

and on the same level, except in clear and absolute cases of judi·
cial error or to correct gross injustice.
Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P2d 821 (1974)
State v. Morgan, 527 P2d 225 (1974)

CONCLUSION
Appellant prays that Judge Sawaya's Order invalidating Mrs.
Nelson's termination of joint tenancy be reversed, that such termination be recognized and the case remanded to the trial court
for appropriate proceedings.
Respectfully
submitted,
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